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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
- - - - - - 000O000 - - - - - -
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal 
corporation of the State of 
Utah. 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
GOLDEN W. ROBBINS 
Defendant and Appellant 
Case No. 14179 
- - - - - - 000O000 - - - - - -
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
This involves the question if Salt Lake City can collect 
a revenue tax from attorneys practicing law alone when the City 
charges them a higher tax than attorneys officing together or in 
a firm. Defendant contends that the tax is invalid and not uniform 
and in violation of the Utah Statute and the State and Federal 
Constitutions. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
In the lower Court, the plaintiff made a Motion for Summary 
Judgment and the defendant made a Motion for Summary Judgment and 
the Court granted plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant asks for reversal of the Judgment entered by the 
Lower Court and asks the Supreme Court to hold that the City 
Ordinance and the manner of enforcement if invalid. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant refused to pay the tax upon the grounds that it 
discriminated against him and all lawyers practicing alone. That 
a lawyer practicing alone pays a tax of $30.00. That the largest 
firm in Utah pays a tax of $3.88 per lawyer. See Affidavit 
of Defendant (R. 30-33)
 # and Third Amended Answer to Defendant's 
Interrogatories (R. 10 8) and the list and amounts paid by attorneys 
(R. 110-120), and Exhibit "A" entitled Alpha Listing City Business 
License Renewals, which was made a part of the Second Amended Answer 
to Defendant's Interrogatories (R. 157), which is a list of 
businesses paying license fees which is about lJr inches thick 
and is part of the record, but not part of the file. 
That the defendant made a Motion for Summary Judgment and based 
it upon the files and records and upon the Affidavit of Defendant 
(S. 28-38). 
That the Legislature in 1935 enacted a statute which was 
Chapter 24, which was brought forward into 1943 at 15-8-80 and 
siibsequently brought forward in Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Replacement 
Volume No. 2, Section 10-8-80, which statute is as follows: 
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"They (cities) may raise revenue by levying and 
collecting a license fee or tax on any business 
within the limits of the city, and regulate the 
same by ordinance; provided, that no Utah city 
or town shall collect a license fee or tax here-
under from any solicitor of salesman who 
solicits obtains orders for or sells goods in such 
city or town solely for resale; and no enumeration 
of powers of cities contained in this chapter 
shall be deemed to limit or restrict the 
general grant of authority hereby conferred. 
All such license fees and taxes shall be uniform 
in respect to class upon which they are imposed," 
That Salt Lake City, relying upon the above quoted section 10-
8-80, passed Ordinance, Section 20-1-1 providing: 
"Unlawful to transact business without a license 
It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in 
or carry on any business, trade or profession or 
calling, within Salt Lake City for the trans-
action or carrying on of which a license is 
required, without first taking out or procuring a 
license required for such business, trade, profess-
ion or calling." 
And Ordinance 20-3-1(2), Engaging in Business: 
"Engaging in business" includes but is not limited 
to the sale of tangible personal property at 
retail or wholesale, the manufacturing of goods 
or property and the rendering of personal 
services for others for a consideration by persons 
engaged in any profession, trade, craft, business 
occupation or other calling, except the rendering 
of personal services by an employee to his employer 
under any contract of personal employment." 
Sec. 20-3-2. License fee levied. (a) There is 
hereby levied upon the business of every person 
engaged in business inSalt Lake City at a place 
of business within the city an annual license fee 
of $30.00 per place of business, plus an additional 
fee of $3.00 for each and every employee, exceeding 
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one, engaged in the operation of said business, 
based upon the number of employees." 
And Ordinance 20-3-1 (4)# states: 
"(4) Employee, "Employee means the operator, 
owner or manager of said place of business and 
any persons employed by such person in the 
operation of said place of business in any 
capacity and also any salesman, agent or 
independent contractor engaged in the operation 
of said place of business in any capacity." 
'That Salt Lake City furnished to the defendant a list of all 
people paying license fees, which is Exhibit A. which was made 
a part of the Second Amended Answer to Defendant's Interrogatories. 
(R. 157)
 f as Exhibit A, not in the file. It is about 1-|- inches 
thick and it is part of the Record on Appeal and is called Alpha 
City Business License Renewals. That the defendant obtained a list 
of all the attorneys practicing in Salt Lake County from the Utah 
State Bar, See Exhibit "A" attached to defendant's Further Answers 
to Plaintiff's Interrogatories, (R. 80-96) and made a calculation 
from Exhibit "A" which shows there is approximately 388 attorneys 
who have paid a license fee in Salt Lake City. Out of this number 
of people, 116 lawyers are practicing alone and there are 69 firms. 
(R. 82-96 and 134-135). 
That there are three different classifications the City is 
taxing. They are taxing professional law corporations and from 
information furnished by the City, they charge $30.00 for one member 
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of the professional corporation arid $3.00 for the other members of 
the law finn. In the case of Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & Mc Carthy# 
according to a new announcement, they have 34 attorneys in the 
firm. Twenty-one are allegedly partners and 13 are paid attorney 
employees or a total of 34 lawyers practicing law and who would 
be paying a total fee of $132.00 or $3.88 per lawyer. Thirty-four 
lawyers practicing alone would pay $1,020.00. 
That in plaintiff's Third Amended Answer to defendant's Interr-
ogatories (R. 110-120) on page 119, it shows the firm of Van Cott, 
Bagley, Cornwall & Mc Carthy paid in 1973, $216.00. See Affidavit 
of Defendant in Opposition to plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
That one lawyer in the firm pays $30.00 and the other lawyers 
in the firm pay $3.00 : $3.00 x 33=$99.00 + $30.00, total $129.00. 
The firm paid a tax of $216.00. There is a difference of $87.00 
which would be for stenographers at $3.00 a piece, would mean that 
there are 29 stenographers and 34 lawyers. 
The second situation is where we have lawyers in the same 
office merely sharing expenses that, they are by no means a firm and 
they are not a partnership or a professional corporation, but they 
merely share expenses. We contend that is discrimination because 
they are all practicing separate and distinct. 
Thus, by officing together attorneys pay a much reduced tax, 
depending on the number of attorneys so officing. Even though such an 
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attorney may utilize just as much office sp-ice# if not more than 
the attorney who practices alone. For example, if ten (10) 
attorneys office together and divide the tax, $30.00 plus $3.00 x 9= 
27.00, the group will pay $57.00, which will make a total of $5.70 
for each attorney as opposed to the $30.00 for the attorney who 
practices alone. (R. 32) If the ten attorneys are practicing alone or 
if they practice across the hall from each other in spearate offices, 
they will pay $300.00. 
That according to the Bar list, there are 873 attorneys in 
Salt Lake City and there are 129 attorneys who have paid a license 
fee individually. We found 354 lawyers in firms paid a license 
fee and the balance did not pay license fees. 
Section 10-8-80 above quoted says only business and plaintiff 
must write into the act something which is not there that they are 
entitled to tax lawyers and lawyers are covered by a special act: 
Title 78, Chapter 51. 
That all lawyers are required to pass an examination and have 
a license to practice law under the Utah State Bar Act. This is 
provided by Title 78, Chapter 51 and Section 1, 23, 24. 
The Utah State Bar has furnished a list of lawyers who can 
practice in Salt Lake County and there are 966 lawyers on that list 
not including judges. We have calculated that there are about 93 in 
6 
Salt Lake County outside of Salt Lake Cityf leaving a balance of 
873 attorneys who can practice in Salt Lake City. See Further 
Answer to Plaintiff's Interrogatories dated September 12# 1973 (R. 80-97) 
ARGUMENT 
' POINT I 
TAX MUST BE UNIFORM ON THE SAME CLASS 
Salt Lake City by its definition makes lawyers in a firm or 
officing together and sharing expenses employees when the fact is 
that they are not employees but are doing business as lawyers. 
The statutef Section 10-8-80 says: 
"***A11 such license fees and taxes shall be 
uniform in respect to class upon which they 
are imposed." 
The class is lawyers and everyone in the law profession must 
be treated substantially equal which is not true if one lawyer 
pays $30.00 and another pays $3.00. If two lawyers are practicing 
together, they would each pay $15.00. If the same two lawyers were 
practicing across the hall from each other, they would each pay $30.00 
or a total of $60.00. 
It is our contention that it is discriminatory to discriminate 
as to one lawyer practicing alone or one lawyer practicing in a firm 
or practicing together and sharing office expenses. 
The case of Roe v. Salt Lake Cityf 20 U. 2d 266f 437 P. 2d 195, 
holds that the tax must be uniform. 
In the Roe Case, the plaintiff relied and the Court held that 
the Ordinance was unconstitutional and plaintiff in the Roe Case 
-7-
i 
relied upon the case of Davis v. Ogden Cityf 117 U. 315, 215 P. 2d 
616. Decided February 25, 1950. 
On page 620 of the Pacific, at the bottom of the first column, 
it states: 
"Moreover, in 1931, this court in the case of 
Morgan v. Salt Lake City et al„, 78 Utah 403, 
3 P. 2d 510, dealt with certain sections of the 
compiled Laws of Utah 1917, which were the 
earlier enactments of, and in most respects 
similar to, the two sections of the 1943 code 
previously quoted. In that casef we held that 
Salt Lake City did not have power to impose a 
license or tax upon the operator of a card room 
because the section of the statutes then in 
force and effect did not enumerate a card 
room as one of the businesses which could be licensed taxed or 
regulated fry the city." 
and on page 621, second column, third paragraph, it states: 
"that the tax was arbitrary and discriminatory. 
The court found that the primary purpose of that 
ordinance was to raise revenue. However, the 
Board of County Commissioners had singled out 
the sheep business and had imposed a license 
solely upon the business of raising, herding and 
pasturing sheep. 
The court refused to uphold the tax on the ground 
that it was unequal and oppressive and said, 21 
Utah at page 227, 61 P. at page 308.- "* * * 
Private rights cannot thus be arbitrarily invaded 
or annihilated under the mere guise of a license. 
One class of citizens cannot thus be compelled 
to bear the burdens of government, to the advantage 
of all other classes. The law, as we have seen, 
will not permit it. Neither the constitution 
nor the statute authorized boards of county 
commissioners to enact ordinances, as in this 
instance, to tax citizens arbitrarily and unjustly, 
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by license which confers no privilege that was 
not previously enjoyed, and which has no view 
to regulation. Unjust and illegal discrimina-
tion between persons, in taxation, and the denial 
of equal justice, are within the prohibitions of 
the constitution of this state, and of the United 
States. No person can be deprived of his property 
without due process of law." 
On page 623, second column, second paragrpah: 
"[10] In the case of Slater v. Salt Lake City, 
Utah 206 P. 2d 153, we reviewed some of the 
authorities dealing with unconstitutional 
ordinances and discussed the elements necessary 
to render an ordinance invalid because of 
discrimination. We quote from that decision 
at page 160 of 206 P. 2d: 'This court has 
passed on the constitutionality of Statutes 
and ordinances and has tested them by the rule 
of unjust discrimination. In State v. Mason, 
94 Utah 501, 78 P. 2d 920, 117 A. L. R. 330; 
Broadbent et al v. Gibson, 105 Utah 53, 140 
P. 2d 939; and Walberg et al, v. Utah Public 
Welfare Commission et al., Utah 203 P. 2d 935, 
we discussed the elements necessary to render a 
statute or ordinance unconstitutional because 
of discrimination. Discrimination is the essence 
of classification and does violence to the 
constitution only whenthe basis upon which it is 
founded is unreasonable. * * * Our function is to 
determine whether an enactment operates equally 
upon all persons similarly situated. If it does 
when the discrimination is within permissible 
legislative limits. If it does not, then the 
differentiation would be without reasonable basis 
and the act does not meet the test of constitution-
ality." 
In this case, there is discrimination between lawyers just 
because they happen to be practicing alone. If they are practicing 
alone, but sharing expenses with another lawyer, they pay less taxes. 
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If they are practicing in a firm they pay one tax, and $3.00 for 
each additional member and we contend that is discrimatory. 
POINT II 
STATUTE DOES NOT GIVE THE CITY AUTHORITY TO TAX 
PROFESSIONS AND PEOPLE RENDERING PERSONAL SERVICES 
BUT ONLY TO TAX BUSINESSES 
That the statute does not allow the City to license professions 
and other people rendering personal services, but that the City 
under the guise of doing business and under their Ordinances has 
been taxing professions, see Exhibit "A". They are taxing doctors 
and other professional people and people rendering personal services 
under the guise that they are doing business and the statute 
does not cover any of them. 
In the case of Davis v. Ogden City, in Judge Pratt's opinion, 
on page 625, first column at bottom of page he states: 
"It is true that the clause last above quoted, 
throws the field wide open for the application 
of Section 15-8-80, U.C.A. 1943, to all 
kinds of business; but there is no reason nor 
logic for concluding that as the result of the 
opening of that field that "professions" have 
suddenly become kinds of "business" and thus 
included in the terms of Section 15-8-80. 
The distinction between a profession and a 
business is still recognized. 
We have repeatedly recognized the practice of law 
as a profession. We've recognized it in our 
case by using such terms as "legal profession" 
or "professional capacity." Ruckenbrod v. 
Mullins, 102 Utah 548, 133 P.2d 324, 114 A.L.R. 
-10-
839; In re Jones 68 Utah 213, 249 P. 803. We 
recognize it in our rules governing "Professional 
Conduct." Section 6-0-14 U.C.A. 1943, refers to 
"professional" misconduct. There are but a very 
few specific instances pertaining to lawyers. 
Section 79-9-18 U.C.A. 1943, defines "unprofession-
al conduct" as it applies to the medical profession. 
Section 79-6-8 U.C.A. 1943, defines the "unpro-
fessional conduct" in the practice of dentistry. 
It seem rather superfluous to mention these facts 
but I wish to emphasize the point that "profess-
ion" and"professions" are not just passing words 
to be discarded as merely decorative of a means 
of livelihood. It is interesting to note that 
the Commission who enacted the Ogden City 
ordinance in question were very particular to 
define "engaging in business" as including 
"the rendition of services by persons engaged 
in any profession." (See Section 20b of the Ordin-
ance) If "business" included "profession" 
this was surplusage. 
* * * Little or nothing has rbeen said about the 
wording of this ordinance. I can't escape the 
belief that, as the majority of this court 
upholds it as a valid excercise of city 
licensing powerf it will become the foundation 
for similar enactments throughout the State. 
If so, I think it is so broad and uncertain as to 
how it will be applied to the professions, that 
it cannot be justly enforced. The power of 
final determination of the amount of the license 
lies with the City Recorder (Sec. 18) who 
presumably will be a layman unfamiliar with what 
is meant by the practice of law, and upon whose 
shoulders will lie the burden of deciding issues 
under such provisions as : "only receipts from 
that portion of business engaged in within the 
corporate limits of "--blank city--"shall be 
included in gross receipts as used herein." 
(Sec. 20c). The practice of law is not defined 
by the ordinance, nor are any rules provided 
to aid the Recorder in allotting business 
between offices if an attorney conducts an office 
in each of two cities and his practice is State wide. 
11 
Such broad unrestricted power as is contemplated 
by the ordinance will lead to arbitrary action." 
We want to call the court's attention that the statute only 
authorised cities to tax business, but that the ordinance went further 
in their definition and state, city ordinance 20-3-1 Sub. 2 "and the 
rendering of personal services for others for a consideration by persons 
engaged in any profession, trade, craft, business, occupation or other 
calling." We submit that the City had no authority to enlarge the 
statute by including professions and people rendering personal 
services. 
POINT III 
UTAH STATE BAR ACT HAS PRE-EMPTED THE FIELD OF 
REGULATING AND TAXING LAWYERS 
The Utah State Bar Act 78-51 with subsections from 1 to 44 
provided for the admissions of lawyers to practice law, their disci-
pline and the disbarring of attorneys. It provides in Section 78-51-21 
for an annual license fee. That the Legislature by enacting these 
sections has pre-empted the regulating and taxing of lawyers. In 
the event that the City wants to tax lawyers in addition to busi-
nesses they should go to the Legislature and get an act passed which 
authorises Cities to tax lawyers and professional people. The City 
should not be allowed under the guise of taxing business, to tax 
lawyers and other professional people. If the City has the power to 
license attorneys, it gives Cities the power to regulate attorneys. 
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Salt Lake City concedes that it does not have the right to regulate 
attorneys. That is to be done by the Utah State Bar. If they do not 
have the right to regulate, they do not have the right to license. 
If you are going to levy a tax, it must be levied upon an 
individual or some legal entity. It cannot be levied upon a place 
of business. The individual must be taxed, not the business. 
A business cannot practice law. Even a professional corporation 
cannot practice law, but it must be by its individual members. A place 
of business is not an entity. A business cannot be a lawyer. A lawyer 
must be an individual, a professional man. 
The lawyers who are hired by the Union Pacific Railroad and have 
an office can be used as an example. The city might tax the Union 
Pacific Railroad as having a place of business, but the City cannot 
tax those lawyers hired by the Union Pacific Railroad as lawyers 
personally. These lawyers should be taxed, which they are not, as prac-
ticing attorneys if the tax on all lawyers is going to be uniform. 
There are professional corporations of attorneys, but a lawyer 
must stand on his own feet as a professional man. Van Cott, Ryter 
and Farnsworth is a professional corporation, but each member must be 
judged by his own conduct. 
If a member of the lawyers hired by the UnionPacific Railroad 
was unethical, the Union Pacific Railroad would not be held liable, 
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but the individual attorney would be the one who would have to 
answer for the unethical conduct and the action would be brought 
against him. Mis-conduct of anyone in a professional firm would 
be treated as a separate matter, not as a matter of the corporation 
or the place of business and the right to practice law and what your 
conduct is is regulated by the Utah State Bar and the Union Pacific 
Railroad is not controlled* by the Utah State Bar. 
Each lawyer must be treated separately. By incorporating a 
professional corporation you do not get away from the personal liability 
of each lawyer. Professional corporations primarily were made for 
tax purposes and did not change the status of lawyers. 
Lawyers must be treated separately and by being in a partner-
ship or a professional corporation does not change their status. 
Section 16-11-1 to 16-11-16 authorizes the forming of professional 
corporations, but the act provides that lawyers are still personally 
liable for their acts. Section 16-11-3 provides: 
"* * *
 while preserving the established pro-
fessional aspects of the personal relationship between 
the professional person and those he serves." 
And Section 16-11-10 provides: 
"Laws as to professional relationships not altered.--
This act does not alter any law applicable to the 
relationship between a person rendering professional 
services and a person receiving such services, 
including liability arising out of such professional 
services." 
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In the lower Court, the defendant relied upon California 
cases. They do not set out the California statute, but it appears 
that the California statute gives special authority to tax and 
regulate professions. In California, they are not trying to tax 
under the guise of business. 
Business is done primarily for profit. Businesses are not held 
up to the ethical conduct as lawyers and doctors. The Union Pacific 
must show a profit for its stockholders. Law is a profession, not 
a business. A Lawyer is held to a higher and stricter ethical and 
moral code. 
POINT IV 
THE TAX HAS BEEN DISCRIMINATIVELY ADMINISTERED IN 
VIOLATION OF THE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 
If a tax is discriminatively administered, it is against the 
equal protection law of both the Utah Constitution, Article I, 
Section 2, and the 14th Amendment, Section 1 of the United States 
Constitution. 
Exhibit "A" and the Plaintiff's Third Amended Answer to 
Defendant's Interrogatories, (R. 108-109) and the exhibit attached 
thereto, (R. 110=120) and Defendant's Affidavit (R. 30-33) and 
Defendant's Further Answers to Plaintiff's Interrogatories (R. 80-81) 
and the exhibit attached thereto (R. 82-96) shows that the tax has been 
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discriminitively administered. That a substantial number of 
lawyers have not paid any tax at all and some lawyers have paid 
taxes of only $3.88 and other varying amounts and some lawyers have 
paid a tax of $7.50 and other Lawyers have been required to pay a 
tax of $30.00. 
At 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law, Section 540, we quote 
as follows: 
"§ 540. Generally. 
The purpose of the equal protection clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal 
Constitution is to secure every person within the 
state's jurisdiction against intentional and 
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned 
by the express terms of the statute or by its 
improper execution through duly constituted 
agents. An actual discrimination arising from 
the method of administering a law is as potent 
in creating a denial of equality of rights^ as a 
discrimination made by law. The validity of a 
state statute under the equal protection clause 
therefore often depends on how it is construed and * 
applied. 
Although as a general rule a law cannot be 
held unconstitutional because, while its just inter-
pretation is consistent with the constitution, it 
is unfaithfully administered by those who are 
charged with its execution it is nevertheless 
an,equally well established principle that a pro-
vision not objectionable on its face may be 
adjudged unconstitutional because of its effect in 
operation. A law, though fair on its face and 
impartial in appearance, which is of such a nature 
that it may be applied and administered with an 
evil eye and unequal hand so as to make unjust and 
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illegal discrimination is, when so applied and 
administered, within the prohibition of the Federal 
Constitution. ^ Hence, in a consideration of the 
classification embodied in a statute, regard should 
be given not only to its final purpose, but likewise 
to the means provided for its administration. *" 
One case involving taxes is the case of Concordia Fire Insurance 
Company v.People of the State of Illinois, 292 U.S. 535, 78 L ed 1411, 
54 S Ct 830, and at 292 U. S. 545, it states: 
"Whether a state statute is valid or invalid under 
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment often depends on how the statute is construed 
and applied. It maybe valid when given a particular 
application and invalid when given another. Here 
the application which was made of I 30 in respect 
of the taxation of the net receipts of 1927, i. e., 
the application made by the assessing officers and 
sustained by the Supreme Court brought the section 
into conflict with the prohibition of that clause. This 
means that as so applied it is invalid, notwithstanding 
its validity in some different applications." 
Also see head note No. 2 which states: 
"2. The validity of a state statute under the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment often 
depends on how it it construed and applied." 
The case of People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 App Div 2d 12, 
225 NYS 2d 128, 4 ALR 3d 393 involves the Sunday Closing Law and at 
4 ALR 3rd, page 398, it states: 
"If the court finds that there was an intentional and 
purposeful discrimination, the court should quash 
the prosecution, not because the defendant is not 
guilty of the crime charged, but because the court, as 
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an agency of government, should not lend itself to a pro-
secution the maintenance of which would violate the 
constitutional rights of the defendant." 
And head note 4 on page 394 states as follows: 
"4. If the court in a criminal prosecution against 
the operator of a drugstore for the sale of certain 
items in violation of the Sunday Statute, finds that 
there was an intentional and purposeful discrimination 
in the enforcement of the law, contrary to the equal 
protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions 
the court should quash the prosecution, not because 
the defendant is not guilty of the crime charged, but 
because the court, as an agency of the government, 
should not lend itself to a prosecution the maintenance 
of which would violate the constitutional rights of the 
defendant." 
CONCLUSION 
We submit that the tax imposed by Salt Lake City is invalid. 
That you cannot tax one lawyer $3.00 and another $30.00. That the City 
has tried by ordinances to include professional people which was not 
covered by the statute. That the field of practicing law and taxing 
of lawyers is pre-empted by the Bar Act. The City is not enforcing 
the statute uniformly and therefore, it is unconstitutional. 
If cities want to tax the professions, they should get an act 
passed by the Legislature giving them such authority. 
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We ask that the Court reverse the decision and enter Judgment 
for the defendant on his Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
GOLDEN W. ROBBINS 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
455 East 400 South, Suite 50 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
WILLIAM H. HENDERSON 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
455 South Third East #104 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
